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The argument that I will be making here is that the key to a well-designed 
macroeconomic policy for development is a mix of sound countercyclical 
policies and a proactive strategy for diversifying production structures. 
These two concepts are deeply rooted in eclac thinking. Countercyclical 
policies must withstand the challenges posed by abrupt external financing 
cycles and sharp fluctuations in commodity prices. Fiscal policy is of pivotal 
importance, but it must be coupled with equally countercyclical monetary and 
exchange-rate policies. In the light of the experience over the past decade, 
this policy mix seems to be achievable if intermediate exchange regimes 
are introduced alongside macroprudential policies, including regulation of 
capital flows. At the same time, the strategy used to spur the development 
of the production sector should foster innovative economic activities that 
generate domestic production linkages. The concept of innovation must be 
understood in a broad sense, but the critical test is its contribution to the 
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  The ideas explored in this article have been developed in the 
course of discussions with many different colleagues, to whom I 
am immensely grateful. In addition, the literature on these issues 
is voluminous, and, in all likelihood, I fail to do it full justice here. 
In attempting to synthesize a number of my writings, I have drawn 
heavily upon them here. 
The recent international financial crisis has been a trial 
by fire for macroeconomic analysis, just as the Great 
Depression of the 1930s was. The orthodox economic 
ideas about self-regulating markets that had prevailed 
in the years leading up to each of these crises did not 
emerge from them unscathed. The Great Depression 
also spawned what we now call macroeconomic 
analysis, which came to the fore under the intellectual 
leadership of John Maynard Keynes. Unfortunately, 
macroeconomic thought has not always remained loyal 
to his legacy. Concern about the possible inflationary 
effects of Kenyesian monetary and fiscal activism was 
at the root of the new orthodoxies that arose in the form 
of monetarism in the 1950s and 1960s. The recent crisis 
has led to a revival of Keynesian thought, particularly 
with respect to his ideas about the inherent instability 
of financial systems and the predominant role played by 
aggregate demand in determining the levels of economic 
activity and employment.
For the developing world, in general, and for 
Latin America, in particular, crises have also spurred 
the development of new economic ideas and practices. 
The Great Depression of the 1930s planted the seed 
for the school of economic thought that was later to 
be developed at the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (eclac) under the intellectual 
leadership of Raúl Prebisch and that would eventually 
come to be known as Latin American structuralism. 
More recently, the implications of the sharp international 
financial cycles experienced by the developing countries 
since the 1970s, together with those of the financial 
and balance-of-payments crises that have accompanied 
them, have inspired new macroeconomic ideas. The 
developing world’s relative success in coping with the 
worldwide economic disturbances of the last few years 
would seem to be a sign that we have finally learned 
how to deal with these situations. And that is why it is 
crucial for use to correctly interpret the significance of 
the factors that have helped us to do so.
Macroeconomic analysis arose out of the need to 
understand short-run macroeconomic dynamics, but later 
on it came to encompass the analysis of economic growth. 
The core ideas in this respect emerged in the 1940s and 
1950s and were elaborated upon in the following decades. 
The idea that took centre-stage had to do with the role of 
technological change as an engine of growth, although 
it was also closely tied to the concept of physical and 
human capital formation. For the developing countries, 
this analysis was, from the very start, associated with 
three other concepts: (i) the role of surplus labour and the 
dualism in labour markets to which it gives rise (which 
ties in very closely with the work of the Caribbean 
economist W. Arthur Lewis); (ii) the idea that balance-of-
payments constraints play a critical role in the short-term 
and long-term macroeconomic dynamics of developing 
countries; and (iii) the crucial role of industrialization 
as a mechanism for the transmission of technological 
progress. This last mechanism operates, in part, via 
investment in machinery and equipment, but one of its 
more interesting aspects is the dynamic economies of 
scale that generate the learning processes associated 
with industrialization.
eclac and structuralist economic thought have 
been, in the past, as now, at the centre of this debate. 
Raúl Prebisch, in whose honour this lecture series is 
named, was obviously the one who pioneered these 
ideas. Section II therefore provides an overview of 
some of the main contributions made by Prebisch and 
eclac to macroeconomic analysis. This discussion 
is followed up in section III with a look at the major 
determinant of business cycles in the world in recent 
decades –international financial cycles– and what 
this implies for a proper countercyclical management 
of macroeconomic policy. The relationship between 
economic growth and the production structure, and 
between the macroeconomy and production-sector 
development, are the focus of section IV, which also 
looks at the crucial role played by the exchange rate. 
These last two sections also include a discussion of Latin 
America’s recent experiences and what they can tell us 
about how closely the region has followed the policies 
suggested by these lines of thinking. The conclusions 
of the analysis are presented in section V.
I
introduction
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1. Classic writings
At the risk of erring on the side of oversimplification, the 
major eclac contributions to macroeconomic thought 
can be said to revolve around two concepts. The first has 
to do with the crucial role of the balance of payments in 
shaping the business cycle in developing countries and, 
hence, its further role as the focus of countercyclical 
policy. The second is the importance of changing 
these countries’ production structures in ways that will 
underpin long-term growth, with industrialization being 
the most prominent manifestation of those changes. Both 
of these ideas have implications for State intervention. 
They are also both linked to a conceptualization of the 
international economic order as a system, composed 
of a centre and a periphery, in which business cycles 
and technical progress originate in the centre and are 
then propagated to the periphery. At least two more 
ideas could be added in: the need to improve financing 
mechanisms; and what has come to be known as the 
structuralist theory of inflation. For the sake of brevity, 
however, these latter two concepts will be dealt with 
only tangentially in this analysis.
The first of these ideas emerged during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The link between external shocks 
and business cycles was already quite well-understood 
in the region, and this was reflected in the fact that, in 
many countries, economic policymakers had tended to 
take the currency off the gold or silver standard for fairly 
long periods of time, although their intention had always 
been to return to it later on and follow the associated 
“rules of the game”. The Great Depression of the 1930s 
changed all this, because it destroyed the mainstays of 
this orthodox view by triggering the complete collapse 
of the gold standard at the centre of the economic order 
itself. Economic theory and practice changed radically: the 
pivotal idea, which was expressed in Keynesian thought, 
is that the basic task of macroeconomic policymakers is 
to use proactive monetary and fiscal policies to smooth 
out business cycles.
Countercyclical macroeconomic policies were also 
introduced in Latin America as a result of the Great 
Depression, but the ways in which they were used to 
influence the market were different, since the determinants 
of the business cycle in the centre and the periphery of 
the world economy also differed. Whereas the focal point 
of Keynesian thought was the stabilization of aggregate 
demand through the use of proactive fiscal and monetary 
policies, the prevalence of external commodity-price 
and capital-account shocks in Latin America steered 
the attention of the countries of the region towards the 
balance of payments.
Traditional macroeconomic analysis has developed 
the concept of “fiscal dominance” (which might be more 
aptly referred to as “fiscal predominance”) in reference 
to situations in which monetary policy is determined by 
public finances. The concept developed by eclac might, 
by analogy, be referred to as “balance-of-payments 
predominance” in short-run macroeconomic dynamics. 
This implies that the basic macroeconomic task of 
economic policymakers is to devise ways of moderating 
external aggregate supply shocks rather than managing 
aggregate demand. The performance of this latter task 
is therefore contingent upon the scope of action that 
economic policymakers can create through skilful 
management of external supply shocks. What is more, 
the crucial problem with respect to the behaviour of 
aggregate demand is that external cycles tend to produce 
what are essentially procyclical effects via exporters’ 
earnings, the supply and cost of external finance, and 
the impact that this has on domestic interest rates; the 
effects on the exchange rate are less straightforward . 
These questions will be discussed later on.
Action designed to influence the balance of 
payments thus became the focus of macroeconomic policy 
in the Latin America countries as decision-makers strove 
to deal with both negative and positive external shocks. 
The types of measures used for this purpose became 
more and more varied and came to include, with some 
differences from country to country, foreign exchange 
and capital controls; import duties and quantitative 
restrictions on imports; taxes on traditional exports 
combined with incentives for non-traditional ones; 
multiple exchange rates; and, from the mid-1960s on, 
gradual managed devaluations (crawling exchangerate 
pegs). Starting in the 1970s, many of these types of 
measures began to be restructured and/or dismantled 
under the countries’ economic liberalization programmes, 
leaving a single tool —the exchange rate— for the 
management of the balance of payments. The effects 
that this has had on economic activity in the short run 
are, as we will see, ambiguous.
II
eclac and macroeconomic analysis
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As can be seen from the types of measures used, 
they were closely linked to the second component 
of macroeconomic policy, for which the focus was 
long-term growth: the industrialization strategy. The 
basic idea underlying this policy is that growth is a 
process of structural change in which primary sectors 
give way to modern industries and services and in 
which industrial activity is the main channel for the 
transmission of technical progress from the centre to 
the periphery —a process that Prebisch found to be 
“slow and irregular”.
There has always been an essential paradox in this 
process because of the complexities involved in managing 
economies whose static comparative advantages clearly 
lie in the production of primary commodities. In the 
classic eclac approach to the subject, industrialization 
strategies were also tied in with the assumption that there 
is a secular downward trend in commodity prices but, at 
least in the way it was framed at the time, this postulate 
has not been borne out by actual events.1 A much more 
solid line of reasoning is based on the fact that different 
sectors of the economy have very different capacities for 
transmitting technical progress and for generating new 
knowledge. This means that the classical justification 
for industrialization did not rely on the existence of a 
downward trend in commodity prices. Moreover, in the 
1930s or immediately after the Second World War, there 
was little need to champion industrialization, since, in 
the wake of the collapse of the world economy, the only 
opportunities available were, by and large, those offered 
by domestic markets.
According to this approach, which was best expressed 
in the “Latin American manifest”, as Albert Hirschman 
dubbed the report issued by the Economic Commission 
in 1949 (Prebisch, 1973), the solution was not to isolate 
the region’s economies from the international economy, 
but rather to redefine the international division of labour 
so that Latin American countries could also reap the 
benefits of technological change, which they rightly 
saw as being closely associated with industrialization. 
In other words, this industrialization strategy sought to 
create new comparative advantages. Industrialization 
policies were modified as time passed in order to correct 
their own excesses and to take advantage of the new 
export opportunities that began to open up in the world 
economy in the 1960s. From that point on, eclac thinking 
1  The empirical evidence shows that, while there was a downturn in 
the twentieth century (but not in the nineteenth), it was not a steady 
trend but rather the result of two sharp declines during the crises of 
the 1920s and of the 1980s (Ocampo and Parra, 2010).
began to evolve from an import-substitution strategy 
(with the institution becoming critical of the excesses 
associated with it) to a “mixed” model that combined 
import substitution with export diversification and 
regional integration.2  This eventually led to the region’s 
widespread adoption of export promotion policies, a 
partial reorganization of the complex system of tariffs 
and quantitative import restrictions,, the streamlining 
or elimination of multiple exchange-rate systems, and 
the introduction of crawling pegs in economies with a 
long history of inflation.3
An inherent problem in dealing with the intersection 
between factors influencing the business cycle and the 
long-term economic strategy is that the changes in relative 
prices precipitated by external cycles make it difficult to 
hold to that strategy. Commodity price booms tend to 
generate incentives for a return to a heavier reliance on 
primary production, both via international price levels 
themselves and via the effects that those booms have 
on exchange rates. Both of these factors tend to exert 
downward pressure on the relative prices of manufactured 
exports and of industrial goods destined for the domestic 
market. Capital-account booms often coincide with sharp 
upswings in commodity prices and have similar effects 
on the exchange rate. In the past, the policy tools devised 
to manage commodity price booms included taxes on 
commodity exports, multiple exchange-rate regimes 
that discriminated against those exports, and incentives 
for non-traditional exports, while capital controls were 
designed to deal with shifts in financing cycles. The 
disappearance of many of these policy instruments 
gave rise, later on, to new challenges, and, too often, 
governments succumbed to the temptation to fall into step 
with external cycles and, in many instances, heightened 
their impacts, rather than mitigating them.
The industrialization strategy entailed a range of 
other elements, including the need to raise the rate of 
investment in industry and physical infrastructure. This 
gave rise to a demand for multilateral external financing 
and to the development of domestic mechanisms such 
as development banking and direct investment by the 
State in infrastructure and some industrial activities, 
although the level of investment varied sharply across 
the region. For the sake of brevity, however, these topics 
will not be explored here.
2  For histories of the development of eclac thought, see Bielschowsky, 
1998; Rodríguez, 2006; and Rosenthal, 2004. For a review of the 
first half-century of the Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, see eclac, 1998c.
3  See Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz and Palma (1998); Ocampo (2004); and 
Bértola and Ocampo (2010).
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Nor will this article delve into the work done during 
those years on the dynamics of inflation. In the structuralist 
view, which was pioneered by Noyola (1956) and Sunkel 
(1958),4 a distinction is drawn between inflationary shocks 
as such and inflation propagation mechanisms. In later 
work on inertial inflation theories, inflationary shocks 
were seen as primarily taking the form of disturbances in 
the exchange rate and in food prices, while mechanisms 
for the propagation of inflation were primarily associated 
with the indexation of prices, especially of wages, the 
exchange rate (in gradual devaluation schemes) and 
finance costs. As part of this dynamic, commodity price 
or exchange rate shocks drive up inflation, which is then 
perpetuated by indexation. These shocks can therefore 
give rise to a sustained increase in inflation, whose level 
may change later on with the advent of additional shocks; 
consequently, inflation, at whatever rate, is always at an 
unstable equilibrium. Therefore, the only way to lower 
inflation is, ultimately, to stabilize basic macroeconomic 
prices and do away with indexation mechanisms, as the 
heterodox experiments in the stabilization of inflation 
of the 1980s indicated. The success or failure of those 
experiments was determined by the aggregate demand 
effects associated with those inflationary processes. 
In effect, this type of inflationary dynamic has a 
recessionary impact because of its impact on aggregate 
demand, whereas the measures used to curb inflation 
are expansionary. Accordingly, attempts to stabilize 
inflation will be successful only if they are combined 
with measures that will counteract those expansionary 
pressures (Taylor, 1991, chap. 4).5
These ideas were formulated long before similar 
Keynesian theories that focused on the stickiness of 
inflation expectations. The policy implications of these 
later theories were quite different, since the focus shifted 
to the credibility of anti-inflation policies. The two schools 
of thought agree on some points, especially with regard 
to situations in which reductions in inflation must be 
supported by the elimination of indexation mechanisms 
(a concession on the part of orthodox theorists to the 
structuralists) and those in which it becomes necessary 
to adopt policies to curb demand in order to allow 
heterodox policies for the stabilization of inflation to 
succeed (a concession on the part of these theorists to 
the orthodox school of thought).
4  See also the contribution made somewhat later on by Olivera (1964).
5  As shown by Taylor (1991) and other authors, aggregate demand effects 
operate primarily through the differing propensities to consume (or, 
more generally, to spend) of the various economic agents. Thus, rising 
inflation works to the benefit of the recipients of capital rents, while 
its stabilization benefits those who are receiving labour income.
2. Contributions in the last two decades
The ground-breaking study entitled Changing Production 
Patterns with Social Equity. The Prime Task of Latin 
American and Caribbean Development in the 1990s 
(eclac, 1990) marked the beginning of a complete 
reworking of eclac thinking which, with some alterations, 
has exhibited a remarkable degree of continuity over the 
past two decades. One of the crucial elements has been 
the continuing commitment to the promotion of equity 
and, going even further, equality, especially with regard 
to citizens’ rights. This commitment also underpins the 
Commission’s most recent contribution, Time for Equality: 
Closing Gaps, Opening Trails (eclac, 2010a), as well 
as its turn-of-the-century Equity, Development and 
Citizenship (eclac, 2000). Here again, the allotted space 
is too limited to do justice to the major effort that was 
undertaken to draw clear connections between economic 
policy and its social outcomes, so the discussion presented 
here will have to be confined to those contributions 
that are most closely related to countercyclical policy 
management and structural change.
In developing its approach to countercyclical policy 
as part of a broader policy package designed to give shape 
to a new fiscal covenant, eclac (1998b) demonstrated 
the need to move away from the procyclical orientation 
that, for the most part, public finances continued to 
demonstrate in Latin America in the 1990s. The key 
element in the Commission’s proposal was the idea of 
isolating the cyclical components of public finances from 
its structural components in terms of both expenditure and 
revenues and to set fiscal targets in line with structural 
rules. This proposal, which has recently been embraced 
in international forums, represents a departure from the 
fiscal responsibility laws that were in vogue at the time. 
Those types of laws, which established targets for the 
current fiscal deficit or set public debt ceilings and which 
were advocated at the time by international financial 
institutions and taken up by the European Union in the 
Treaty of Maastricht, are intrinsically procyclical.
eclac also proposed that the proceeds from 
short-lived upswings in fiscal revenues occasioned by 
high prices for given natural resources or by cyclical 
increases in tax revenues in general should be used to 
set up stabilization funds, rather than being spent during 
economic booms, so that they could be used to finance 
public spending during crises. It also pointed out the 
need to find ways of keeping accurate accounts on the 
quasi-fiscal expenditures involved in extending loan 
guarantees to the financial system and hedging private 
infrastructure investment risk. Both of these types 
12
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of guarantees are inherently procyclical, since these 
contingent expenditures are incurred during booms but 
are actually disbursed during busts, when they often 
displace other types of expenditure as well.
Another short-run issue that was addressed by 
various authors, particularly eclac (1998a and 2000), 
revolved around the management of external financing 
cycles, whose ravages had already been felt in the 
region. The main policy recommendation offered in 
this respect was to take precautions to ensure that the 
real exchange rate did not become overvalued during 
booms. Whereas the prevailing line of thinking at the 
time was that exchange-rate regimes should be at one or 
the other extreme of the continuum of possible systems 
(either completely flexible or absolutely fixed, such as 
dollarization or the convertibility system adopted at 
the time by Argentina), eclac advocated intermediate 
systems, such as managed floats. It also proposed that 
steps should be taken to smooth out external financing 
cycles by reducing capital inflows during periods of 
financial-market euphoria through the use of measures 
such as the reserve requirements on capital inflows that 
were being used at that time by Chile and Colombia.
eclac (2000, vol. III, chap. 1) then went even 
further, suggesting that domestic financial regulations 
could be used as countercyclical tools. This implied 
that prudential regulation should take into account not 
only microeconomic risks but also the macroeconomic 
risks incurred during periods of rapid credit growth. In 
order to do so, eclac suggested that capital and liquidity 
requirements for financial institutions should be raised 
during credit booms, that the asset-liability currency 
mismatches that tended to proliferate when external 
financing was in ample supply should be corrected, 
and that caps should be placed on the value of assets 
that could be used as collateral during periods of asset 
price inflation. To use the terminology proposed soon 
thereafter by the Bank of International Settlements, which 
came into general use during the recent crisis, eclac 
was nearly a decade ahead of its peers in proposing the 
use of “macroprudential” regulations to manage capital 
inflows and domestic credit.
In line with the proposals concerning economic 
growth that it put forward in its seminal 1990 study, eclac 
(1998a, 2000, 2007 and 2008a) went on to offer up an 
agenda for the development of the production sector in 
open economies. The point of departure for this agenda, 
as well as for the Commission’s more classic theories, 
was the idea that development is a process of structural 
change in which progress hinges on the economy’s ability 
to develop more technologically advanced production 
sectors. Accordingly, together with the promotion of 
more competitive production structures and “horizontal” 
policies to correct factor-market failures,6 eclac proposed 
a series of policies for developing more dynamic 
production structures by fostering innovative activities 
with greater technological content (national innovation 
systems) and promoting exports (diversification of export 
products, domestic export linkages and the conquest 
of new markets). It also suggested ways of developing 
inter-sectoral synergies and complementarities in order 
to achieve “systemic competitiveness”, which was the 
seminal concept put forward in Changing Production 
Patterns with Social Equity.
One of the situations that this type of policy ran up 
against (and, for the most part, continues to do so) is the 
institutional void that was created with the elimination 
of the mechanisms for supporting production sectors 
that had been created in the region during the period of 
State-led industrialization. eclac advocated the idea of 
forming public-private partnerships (which each country 
should establish in line with its own characteristics 
and development history) to rebuild these institutional 
frameworks. The destruction of earlier institutions and 
the failure to build others to replace them were seen as 
the root causes of the fragility of the region’s production 
structures. This strategy was also tied in with short-
term macroeconomic policy because of policymakers’ 
obsession with maintaining competitive exchange 
rates, which were viewed as an essential ingredient of 
proactive policies for fostering the diversification of the 
production sector.
The recent turns taken by economic debates 
appear to have validated the approach taken by eclac 
to short-run macroeconomic policy. The widespread 
acceptance in the past few years of innovation strategies 
also reaffirms the validity of the approach which eclac 
advocated during Latin America’s industrialization stage 
and which it has continued to endorse and to adapt to 
changing circumstances in the region that affect its 
development process.
6  These policies focused on providing small and medium-sized enterprises 
(smes) with access to long-term capital and, more generally, to credit, 
as well as to technology, skilled human resources and land.
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1. Contemporary forms of “balance-of-
payment predominance”
International trade continues to have a powerful impact 
on the balance of payments in developing countries, in 
general, and in Latin American countries, in particular. 
This is especially true in the case of the terms of trade for 
commodity producers. The recent crisis has demonstrated 
that the quantum of exports of manufactures and services 
(especially in the tourism industry, which is the region’s 
largest service export sector) is also procyclical. The 
issues relating to commodity prices, which continue to 
have a strong influence on the Latin American countries, 
will be explored in a later section.
The importance of these trade variables 
notwithstanding, since the 1970s the capital account 
has played a central role in the economic fluctuations 
experienced by developing countries, particularly the 
growing number of them that have access to international 
private capital markets. Moreover, although a considerable 
part of the instability generated by external financing 
cycles is transmitted through public-sector accounts (as 
was particularly the case in Latin America in the 1970s 
and 1980s), the predominant factor in recent decades 
has been the steep fluctuations in private expenditure 
and balance sheets associated with these cycles. One 
outcome of all this has been the proliferation, since the 
1970s, of “twin crises” (i.e., combined external and 
domestic financial crises). The crises that broke out in 
the early 1980s in the Southern Cone were some of the 
first of this type. 
This is, of course, just one manifestation of a more 
general problem: the tendency of financial sectors to 
experience boom-bust cycles. This was a central concern 
in the Keynesian revolution and was analysed with 
remarkable insight by Minsky (1982). The existence of 
this pattern has been corroborated, at an empirical level, 
by the classic writings of Kindleberger (see Kindleberger 
and Aliber, 2005), the more recent work of Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009) and, in relation to emerging economies 
and those of Latin America in particular, the studies 
of Agosin and Huaita (2009) and Ffrench-Davis and 
Griffith-Jones (2011), among others. The emblematic 
aspects of this pattern are volatility and contagion. As 
the cycle unfolds, financial agents alternate between 
“appetite for risk” (or, perhaps more accurately, an 
underestimation of risk) and “flight to quality” (risk 
aversion); these perceptions and expectations feed into 
one another, generating, first, a contagion of optimism, 
followed by a contagion of pessimism. The information 
asymmetries that characterize financial markets, as well 
as the use of risk-assessment models and certain market 
practices (“competitive benchmarking”, for example), 
tend to accentuate these trends.
The effects of these cycles are particularly harsh in 
the case of agents that are considered by the market as 
high risks. These agents have ample access to financing 
during booms but find themselves cut off from financing 
during downturns in the business cycle. At the country 
level, these agents are smes and low-income households, 
while, at the international level, they are emerging and 
developing economies.7 This situation can be interpreted 
as one in which the financial integration of the developing 
world is segmented; in other words, market integration 
is segmented into different risk levels and developing 
countries are placed in high-risk categories and are 
therefore subject to particularly strong cyclical shocks 
(Frenkel, 2008).
As a result, countries experience boom-bust cycles 
that are somewhat removed from their economies’ 
macroeconomic fundamentals (Calvo, Leiderman 
and Reinhart, 1993; and Calvo and Talvi, 2008). The 
countries considered to be “successful” are particularly 
liable to experience such booms, which tend to give rise 
to large private-sector deficits that can ultimately leave 
them in vulnerable positions (Ffrench-Davis, 2005; 
and Marfán, 2005). As a consequence of this dynamic, 
economies that are at one point regarded as success 
stories may end up being pariahs in the international 
financial community.
Volatility is reflected in risk premiums as well as 
in the supply and maturity profile of financing, which 
are all procyclical. Risk levels also tend to be higher 
in developing countries owing to shortcomings in the 
development of their financial sectors, which show up in 
the form of currency and maturity mismatches on firms’ 
balance sheets. Although all forms of financing tend to 
7  The term “emerging economies” has no clear definition, so the 
broader term of “developing countries” will be used to refer to the 




MACRoEConoMy foR dEVELoPMEnT: CoUnTERCyCLICAL PoLICIES And PRodUCTIon SECToR TRAnSfoRMATIon  •  JoSé AnTonIo oCAMPo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 1
be procyclical, this pattern is more marked in short-term 
finance, which therefore carries a higher level of risk 
(Rodrik and Velasco, 2000). Foreign direct investment, 
by contrast, tends to be somewhat more stable. 
Although strong short-term shocks —such as the 
Russian moratorium of August 1998 or the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008— are especially 
traumatic, medium-term fluctuations generate even 
more serious problems. Since the mid-1970s, we have 
witnessed three cycles of this type and we may be in 
the midst of a fourth one. The boom of the second half 
of the 1970s was followed by the crisis of the 1980s; 
the boom of 1990-1997 (with the brief interruption of 
the Mexican crisis in December 1994) gave way to the 
crisis in Asia and other emerging economies that broke 
out in 1997; the boom seen between 2003 and mid-2008 
was followed by the sharp contraction triggered by the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers; and the boom that started 
in mid-2009.
Figure 1 traces the changes seen in risk premiums 
since 1997 and illustrates the fact that the intensity 
and duration of the shock generated by the Russian 
moratorium of August 1998 were far greater than those 
seen during the most recent crisis. One reason for this is 
that the duration of any given crisis is directly correlated 
with the scale of the measures taken by industrialized 
countries to contain it. This is why the Mexican crisis 
of December 1994 did not have a major impact on the 
developing world, and the same is true of the most recent 
international financial crisis. Another reason is that the 
improvement in macroeconomic policies has succeeded 
in reducing emerging economies’ external vulnerability. 
This was one of the factors in the steep reduction in 
risk premiums for emerging economies experienced 
in 2004-2007, which bottomed out shortly before the 
subprime mortgage crisis erupted in the United States 
in August 2007, as well as, in particular, the lessened 
impact of the crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. In that sense, the events that have occurred in 
international financial markets since the mid-2000s can 
be interpreted as signalling a reduction in the market 
segmentation of preceding decades thanks to better-
designed macroeconomic policies (Frenkel, 2010). 
The problems posed by these medium-term cycles 
have to do not only with the procyclical behaviour of 
private expenditure, but also with the pressure exerted 
on decision-makers to adopt procyclical macroeconomic 
policies and the declining effectiveness of countercyclical 
policies. As we will see, this problem is particularly 
evident in the case of monetary policy. In fact, precisely 
because of the limited effectiveness of the different 
policies and the constraints involved, it is important to 
have a wide range of policy tools to choose from. This 
is especially the case because macroeconomic stability 
—the core objective of countercyclical policies— it 
not simply a matter of price levels (as it is portrayed as 
being in many studies), but also of stability in financial 
activity, economic activity and employment (real 
economic stability). 
In fact, while a great deal of progress has been made 
in curbing inflation and, during the recent upheaval, in 
averting national financial crises, the intensity of the 
business cycle has not abated so far. In fact, the 2009 
recession was quite deep in the region, with gross domestic 
product (gdp) falling more sharply than at any other 
time since 1983, and this is true regardless of whether 
FIGURE 1
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the drop is measured in terms of weighted growth rates 
or a simple average for the various Latin American 
economies, which indicates that it occurred across the 
board (see figure 2). The region’s performance was also 
worse than any other world region except Central and 
Eastern Europe (Ocampo and others, 2010), although it 
rebounded vigorously, especially in the case of the South 
American economies. Hence the importance of continuing 
to refine the design of countercyclical policies.
The following discussion will focus on how effective 
three different types of policies —fiscal, monetary and 
exchange-rate policies— are in smoothing out the business 
cycle. Because these policies are so closely interrelated, 
they will be approached as a single unit. We will also look 
at what Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003) termed “capital 
management techniques” (Ocampo, 2008), although here 
I will refer to them as macroprudential policies, in line 
with the most recent terminology being used.
2. Countercyclical fiscal policies
In open economies, it is very difficult to use monetary 
policy as a countercyclical tool, especially when the 
capital account has been opened. This is why fiscal policy 
is clearly a better instrument for the job. In countries 
where commodity price fluctuations are one of the 
primary sources of cyclical swings, one alternative is to 
set up stabilization funds. The most instructive example 
of this approach in recent years is provided by Chile; 
going back a few years further, another is Colombia’s 
National Coffee Fund. Based on these experiences and 
in line with recommendations made by eclac (1998b), 
consideration should be given to setting up stabilization 
funds for public revenues on a larger scale in order 
to absorb the transitory components of government 
revenues. 
More generally, as also proposed by eclac andas 
Chile has been doing, it would be a good idea to establish 
structural rules for the management of public finances in 
order to isolate the cyclical components of both public 
revenues and expenditures. This is no easy task, of course, 
because, among other things, the trend of gdp may not 
be independent from the business cycle in economies 
that are hit by strong cyclical swings (Heymann, 2000) 
and because commodity price shocks often generate 
changes that ultimately become permanent (i.e., they 
reverse a pre-existing trend). 
Be that as it may, the implication is that structural 
rules should guide public expenditure on the basis of 
its long-term trend. Strictly speaking, this is a neutral 
(or acyclical) rule in terms of the business cycle and 
should therefore be coupled with strictly countercyclical 
FIGURE 2
Latin America: gdp growth, 1975-2011
(Percentages)
Source: Original estimates based on information drawn from the database maintained by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (eclac).
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expenditures.8 However, in order to avoid lags in the fiscal 
policy response, it is better to have some components 
of expenditure that respond automatically to variations 
in the business cycle.
Industrialized countries’ experiences suggest that 
it is best to have automatic stabilizers linked to social 
protection mechanisms. Although unemployment 
insurance fulfils this role in those countries, it is not 
necessarily the best mechanism to use in developing 
economies, where the informal sector accounts for a 
large part of job creation. It may therefore be wise to use 
additional instruments, such as emergency employment 
schemes that kick in automatically when a crisis hits. 
Conditional cash transfers were used for this purpose in 
a number of Latin American countries during the recent 
crisis, but it is highly unlikely that they can be cut back 
during economic booms, as a good countercyclical policy 
measure should be.
In addition to policies on expenditure, tax measures 
can also be designed to serve countercyclical purposes. 
The best tool is a progressive income tax, which acts as 
an automatic stabilizer. Other tax measures can also be 
designed to act as stabilizers (e.g., taxes that will directly 
absorb a portion of commodity producers’ windfall 
profits, with the tax receipts going to the corresponding 
stabilization fund). A similar argument can be made for 
taxing capital inflows during credit booms. It should be 
noted that this argument is based on fiscal considerations, 
in addition to the monetary and exchange-rate factors 
(which will be discussed later on) that make this type 
of tax advisable. Using the same approach, a value-
added tax (vat) could be designed whose rates varied 
in step with the business cycle. Temporary tax cuts to 
spur demand are another option that was used in some 
countries of the region during the recent crisis.
There are, of course, economic and political 
constraints on the implementation of countercyclical 
fiscal policies. The most serious economic problems in 
this respect are the lack of access to financing during 
recessions and the pressure exerted by the market (and, 
possibly, the International Monetary Fund (imf), although 
its stance in this respect has changed in recent years) 
for the adoption of fiscal austerity policies to generate 
credibility —i.e., to give signs that there is no default 
risk. If the authorities are obliged to adopt austerity 
policies, they will have a difficult time, politically, in 
justifying the continuation of those policies once economic 
conditions have improved. This sets up a vicious circle 
8  See, for example, the analysis of Chilean fiscal mechanisms in 
Ffrench-Davis (2010).
in which austerity measures during a crisis are followed 
by increases in spending during the recovery, thus giving 
shape to a procyclical pattern in public finances.
Nor is it an easy task to justify austerity measures 
during economic booms as a means of counterbalancing 
the exuberance of private spending and, in particular, of 
upswings in expenditure in high-income groups (Marfán, 
2005). This is especially the case if cuts are made in items 
of expenditure that have a progressive social impact, 
since countercyclical fiscal policies will then be seen as 
having a regressive effect. What is more, policymakers 
may also face classic time inconsistencies associated with 
political decision-making. In particular, the practice of 
setting funds aside during booms may spark pressure to 
spend them (as occurred in Chile during the boom that 
preceded the recent global crisis) or even to squander 
them in the form of unsustainable and unwise tax cuts 
(as was done in the United States after the Clinton 
Administration built up a budget surplus).
The countercyclical management of public 
expenditure can also generate inefficiencies (e.g., 
interruptions of public works during booms that ultimately 
increase their cost) or long-term rigidities (increases in 
social spending or tax cuts during crises that then become 
permanent). In addition, for strictly political reasons, it 
may be difficult to design countercyclical tax measures, 
as demonstrated by the opposition to tax increases for 
commodity exporters during boom periods.
For all of these reasons, countercyclical fiscal 
policies have been the exception rather than the rule in 
the developing world. In their study of cyclical patterns 
in public expenditure in over 100 countries in 1960-2003, 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) found that —unlike 
what had occurred in industrialized countries— fiscal 
policies had indeed tended to be procyclical in developing 
countries, especially in Africa and Latin America. 
Working on the basis of these estimates, Ocampo and 
Vos (2008, chap. IV) have shown that this procyclical 
pattern is associated with lower long-term growth. In 
the case of Latin America, Martner and Tromben (2003) 
concluded that procyclical episodes outnumbered the 
periods in which neutral or countercyclical policies 
were in place during the years from 1990 to 2001. This 
finding has also been corroborated by Bello and Jiménez 
(2008) for the period 1990-2006. Procyclical patterns in 
social expenditure have also been a recurring theme in 
the analyses presented in the annual studies published by 
eclac in the Social Panorama of Latin America series 
(see, for example, eclac, 2010b). 
There is no clear indication that anything approaching 
steady progress has been made in this area in recent years. 
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Some countries have tended to adopt countercyclical 
policies, but procyclical patterns continue to predominate.9 
Figure 3 illustrates the characteristic pattern for the region 
as a whole over the last two decades: with moderate deficits 
(which indicates that this is not a recent achievement but 
rather the product of adjustments made during the “lost 
decade”), primary expenditure exhibits a procyclical 
pattern with a one- or two-year lag. This pattern can 
be outlined as follows: during booms, the upturn in 
revenues precedes the recovery of primary expenditure, 
but the latter speeds up towards the end of the boom 
(2006-2008, in the latest one); spending continues to rise 
during the initial phase of the crisis (2009, as well as in 
1999), but then slows as policymakers strive to reduce 
fiscal imbalances. These lags make it seem as though a 
countercyclical policy is being followed during the initial 
phases of booms and busts, but the underlying pattern 
is actually procyclical. An analysis of the most recent 
cycle at the country level clearly shows that countries 
in which primary expenditure has been countercyclical 
are the exception rather than the rule. Table 1 shows the 
different categories of countries, with the vast majority 
exhibiting a procyclical pattern. It also includes a third 
9  See, inter alia, idb (2008), eclac (2008b, chap. IV) and Ocampo 
(2007) for a discussion of the boom that preceded the most recent 
crisis and imf (2010, chap. 4) for an analysis of the most recent 
business cycle as a whole.
category corresponding to countries that have tended 
to increase expenditure levels during both phases of 
the cycle. 
Notwithstanding the headway made in terms of 
fiscal discipline —which, as noted earlier, dates quite 
far back at this point— and the reductions seen in almost 
all of the countries’ public debt levels, much remains to 
be done in designing appropriate countercyclical fiscal 
policies and in building the necessary institutions to 
back them up.
3. Monetary and exchange-rate autonomy in 
economies characterized by “balance-of-
payments predominance”
An examination of the crises experienced by the developing 
world in recent decades demonstrates the accuracy of 
the Economic Commission’s characterization of the 
developing countries as being subject to “balance-of-
payments predominance” and, especially in the past 
few decades, to capital-account cycles. It also provides 
categorical evidence that one of the main problems is 
that these cycles put pressure on decision-makers to 
employ procyclical monetary and exchange-rate policies. 
This is particularly true in the case of monetary policy, 
since economies that have opened up their capital 
accounts come under pressure to lower interest rates 
during booms and raise them during crises. When the 
FIGURE 3
Latin America: public-sector revenues and primary expenditure, 1990-2010
(Percentages of gdp)
Source: Original estimates based on information drawn from the database maintained by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (eclac).




































MACRoEConoMy foR dEVELoPMEnT: CoUnTERCyCLICAL PoLICIES And PRodUCTIon SECToR TRAnSfoRMATIon  •  JoSé AnTonIo oCAMPo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 1
TABLE 1
Latin America: features of public expenditure
Real increase in primary spen-
ding (percentages)  
Increase in spending, 
2004-2008, vs.  
gdp growth in:
2004-2008 2009 2010 2004-2008 1990-2010
Countercyclical 
 Chile 5.5 15.3 4.4  1.15 1.10
 El Salvador 1.6 10.8 5.1  0.49 0.47
 Paraguay 2.0 28.0 11.4  0.42 0.73
 Peru 7.3 12.7 12.6  0.96 1.66
Acyclical (moderate increase)
 Guatemala 2.3 4.6 3.3  0.52 0.62
Acyclical (steady increase)
 Argentina 12.3 19.7 14.5  1.46 3.03
 Colombia 7.7 10.9 –4.2  1.41 2.21
 Costa Rica 7.6 10.6 3.3  1.29 1.61
 Uruguay 7.0 7.4 10.7  0.84 2.02
Procyclical
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 10.2 0.2 10.2  2.12 2.67
 Brazil 7.9 2.2 10.6  1.67 2.91
 Dominican Republic 11.7 –12.1 0.7  1.67 2.26
 Ecuador 19.7 6.0 7.4  3.66 6.34
 Honduras 8.1 3.5 –3.8  1.38 2.29
 Mexico 5.7 3.4 –3.6  1.71 2.05
 Nicaragua 6.9 5.1 3.0  1.73 2.33
 Panama 12.8 –0.3 6.3  1.46 2.26
 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 12.6 –1.4 –12.5  1.22 4.28
        
 Average 8.3 7.0 4.4  1.40 2.27
Source: Original estimates based on information drawn from the database maintained by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (eclac).
authorities do not allow themselves to be swayed by 
this pressure and opt for a countercyclical policy, they 
simply shift the pressure onto the exchange rate, which 
results in a stronger currency during booms and a weaker 
one during busts. This indicates that the authorities in 
charge of monetary and exchange-rate policies are not 
actually autonomous and that all they can do is to choose 
between the two types of procyclical effects.10 Although 
this may be more or less the case in different countries, 
it nonetheless speaks to a highly conspicuous facet of 
monetary and exchange-rate dynamics in economies 
with open capital accounts.
The exchange-rate fluctuations generated by capital 
movements have ambiguous effects in the short run 
and counterproductive ones in the long run. Their main 
10  This is something akin to what Robert Mundell famously said when 
he noted that, in the presence of a fixed exchange rate, the authorities 
cannot control the money supply, but can only influence the mix of 
domestic and external assets on the central bank’s balance sheets. 
countercyclical effect is reflected in the current account 
of the balance of payments, which tends to deteriorate 
during booms and to improve during crises. Beyond a 
certain level, however, this pattern is counterproductive. 
In fact, revaluation and the resulting deterioration in 
the current account during booms have been the root 
cause of crises in the past, since, although they help to 
“absorb” excess credit during booms, they then become 
the main source of economic vulnerability when capital 
movements change direction. In view of this fact and 
the ambiguous effects that exchange-rate volatility has 
on specialization and growth patterns (a topic that we 
will return to later), the structuralist literature has come 
down firmly on the side of those who are not in favour 
of using this type of adjustment mechanism, at least 
beyond a certain level.11
11  See, for example, Ffrench-Davis (2005); Frenkel (2007 and 2010); 
Ocampo (2003 and 2008); Ocampo, Rada and Taylor (2009); and 
Stiglitz and others (2006).
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This effect of exchange-rate fluctuations has often 
proved to be weaker than the procyclical effects of 
two other factors that have a great deal to do with the 
ambiguity of the exchange rate’s effects on aggregate 
demand and thus on its usefulness as a countercyclical 
instrument. The first and perhaps most important of these 
two factors is the impact that the exchange rate has on 
private-sector balance sheets in economies in which 
this sector is a net debtor to the rest of the world, as has 
tended to be the case in Latin America.12 In these cases, 
a revaluation brought about by an abundance of capital 
during booms generates capital gains that boost aggregate 
demand; by the same token, devaluations during crises 
trigger capital losses that have recessionary effects. These 
impacts are compounded by the distributional effects that 
have been discussed in the traditional literature on the 
recessionary impacts of devaluations (Díaz-Alejandro, 
1988, chap. 1; and Krugman and Taylor, 1978). The 
simplest way of visualizing this is to look at real wages: 
a revaluation tends to cause them to rise, which will 
have an expansionary effect if there is a high propensity 
to spend labour income, while a devaluation during a 
crisis will depress real wages, which will further reduce 
aggregate demand.
The traditional macroeconomic literature has 
characterized the constraints that economic authorities 
face as a “trilemma” in open economies. The most 
important implication here is that, in economies with 
open capital accounts, the authorities can control the 
exchange rate or the interest rate, but not both. In the 
years leading up to the crisis, this prompted advocates 
of this view to proclaim that the only sustainable (or 
“credible”) exchange-rate regimes were those that were 
completely flexible (those in which the authorities choose 
to maintain their monetary autonomy but entirely give 
up their autonomy in handling the exchange rate) or 
those with fixed or managed exchange rates (in which 
the authorities opt for autonomy in dealing with the 
exchange rate but relinquish the ability to manage 
monetary policy). Moreover, since fixed but readjustable 
exchange rates are prone to destabilizing speculative 
movements, the best approach in such cases —in this 
view— is to opt for a rigid regime based on currency 
boards or dollarization, in which the authorities give 
up their autonomy in respect of both monetary and 
exchange-rate policy.
The line of reasoning being followed in this 
analysis indicates that the problem with the second of 
12  This also applies to public-sector balance sheets, but this effect 
has already been analysed in the preceding subsection.
these options is that it is clearly procyclical and, more 
importantly, when it is adopted in an extreme form that 
lacks credibility, its collapse can be chaotic, as was seen 
in Argentina at the start of the twenty-first century and in 
many countries when the gold standard was abandoned 
in the 1930s.
The option of having flexible exchange rates and 
an inflation-targeting monetary policy does, on the other 
hand, have some countercyclical virtues, provided that 
(and, therefore, to the extent that) aggregate domestic 
demand is the main determinant of inflation.13 Nonetheless, 
the exchange-rate variations that this system allows to 
take place tend to have procyclical effects on aggregate 
demand, however, for the reasons already mentioned. 
Moreover, given the interrelationship between the 
exchange rate and inflation, it can have procyclical 
effects under a pure inflation targeting system: since a 
revaluation will tend to push prices down during a boom, 
interest rates do not climb enough to contain the surge 
in demand; on the other hand, the inflationary effect of 
a devaluation prompts decision-makers to adopt a tight 
monetary policy during crises. Thus, as noted by theorists 
who look at inflation targeting systems, a strict regime 
of this type tends to heighten the volatility of economic 
activity (Svensson, 2000).
Clearly, with a “flexible” system of inflation targeting 
–in which the level of economic activity is also taken into 
account– these problems are at last partially corrected, 
but the effects that the exchange rate has on price levels 
also need to be corrected. What is more, if external 
shocks and indexation are the fundamental determinants 
of inflation, rather than fluctuations in aggregate demand 
(as posited in structuralist theory), then the foundations 
for using inflation targeting as a rule for monetary policy 
management crumble.14 It therefore makes much more 
sense to say, as is implicitly assumed in flexible inflation 
targeting regimes, that, within the constraints that they 
face in trying to reconcile their various goals, central 
banks of developing countries should focus on at least 
three different types of objectives: inflation, economic 
13  Under these conditions, what macroeconomic theorists have called 
the “divine coincidence” comes into play. This coincidence is one 
in which the achievement of inflation targets will ensure success in 
stabilizing economic activity at full employment. Needless to say, this 
outcome has yet to be seen even in industrialized countries.
14  This analytical framework also assumes that demand is sensitive 
to interest rates and that the interest rates set by the central bank 
have a significant influence on the rates that affect consumption and 
investment decisions. Both of these assumptions may not hold in 
developing countries, and this is certainly the case in economies with 
underdeveloped financial systems. 
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activity and the exchange rate.15 In addition, financial 
stability objectives should be added, as stability in 
financial markets is closely tied to macroeconomic 
stability. This does not mean, of course, that inflation 
should be a secondary or contingent goal. Quite to the 
contrary, in economies with a tradition of inflation such 
as those of Latin America, it must obviously be one of 
the primary objectives.
An alternative reading of this “trilemma” is that 
freedom of capital movements is what should be 
relinquished. The need to set multiple targets, as noted 
above, also means that the authorities need to have a 
wider array of policy tools for meeting those targets, 
and this is all the more so when the effectiveness of 
individual tools is limited.16 This situation points up 
one of the underlying problems in the macroeconomic 
management of open economies: the cost of doing 
without given policy instruments is high in economies 
subject to balance-of-payments predominance. In the 
past, Latin American economies had countless policy 
instruments at their disposal for mitigating external 
shocks, including trade policy tools and capital and 
exchange-rate regulations. When they gave up these 
tools, the full burden of managing external shocks was 
shifted onto the exchange rate, which is not necessarily 
the most appropriate countercyclical policy tool, as 
discussed above. If the instruments used in the past are 
now not sufficient for dealing with the challengesnow 
being faced by Latin American economies, then the 
authorities must devise new ones. 
In the face of these dilemmas, economic authorities 
in the developing world have arrived at the pragmatic 
conclusion that, not only are extreme regimes 
counterproductive, but also that other tools need to be 
used in order to regain monetary and exchange-rate 
policy autonomy. The two most popular types of policies 
have been the active management of foreign exchange 
reserves and a return to the regulation of capital flows. 
Both of these instruments are being used with clearly 
countercyclical objectives in mind and show that exchange-
rate management in the developing world is moving in 
the direction of “intermediate” exchange-rate regimes 
based on a form of “administered” (and, in many cases, 
15  The Federal Reserve Act of the United States establishes a number 
of objectives. There is no mention of the exchange rate, but one of 
the goals set forth in the Act is the promotion of moderate long-term 
interest rates. The stated objective for economic activity is defined 
as “maximum employment,” which is listed before the objective of 
stable prices.
16  This is the underlying message in one of the most well-known 
writings of Stiglitz (1998).
such as those seen in East Asian nations and Peru, heavily 
administered) flexible exchange-rate regimes. One way 
of thinking about this is to say that these countries are 
taking up positions inside the triangle formed by the 
“trilemma”. They have also been adding another policy 
tool —countercyclical prudential regulations— into the 
mix. These regulations, in conjunction with regulations 
on capital flows, have been included in policymakers’ 
macroprudential toolkits, which also sometimes include 
traditional monetary instruments, such as the active 
management of bank reserve requirements. This latter 
policy tool was reintroduced by various Latin American 
countries during the 2003-2008 boom and was used 
for opposite purposes, as an expansionary instrument, 
during the crisis.17 
The chief advantage of a policy stance whereby the 
authorities actively manage foreign exchange reserves 
is that they can then control both the exchange rate and 
interest rates, even in the presence of capital mobility 
—within, of course, certain limits. This point has also 
been made by Frenkel (2007). During boom times, 
this obviously calls for the sterilized accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves. As demonstrated by the 
developing world’s experience during the most recent 
global financial crisis, the availability of reserves 
provides more manoeuvring room for the adoption of 
expansionary monetary policy measures during crises 
in order to counter contractions in aggregate demand. 
Proactive management of these reserves makes it 
possible to cushion the impact of capital flows on the 
exchange rate during booms, while at the same time 
helping to stave off future crises. Maintaining reserves 
at high levels therefore helps to ensure the stability of 
intermediate exchange-rate regimes. This policy is not 
cost-free, however, especially since building up sterilized 
reserves is expensive. At the national level, the yield on 
reserve assets is lower than the yield of capital inflows 
during booms, and from the standpoint of the central 
bank, the cost of sterilization instruments is generally 
higher than the yield of reserves (although, over time, 
the capital gains generated by the management of such 
reserves may offset that cost).
The existence of these costs is precisely what justifies 
the reintroduction of a second instrument, although on 
a smaller scale: the regulation of capital flows in order 
to curb volatile capital inflows during booms. The term 
“capital account regulation” is preferable to the term 
“capital controls”, since, in practice, it operates much 
17  This was also done, for example, by imf (2010, chap. 3), but it is 
best to draw a clear distinction between the two.
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like other forms of financial regulation. Since these types 
of regulations avert volatile capital inflows, they have 
prudential effects and can therefore rightly be called 
“prudential capital account regulations”. They have 
two types of effects: they make the structure of external 
liabilities less volatile, and they provide more scope for 
the adoption of countercyclical macroeconomic policies. 
Consequently, like the proactive management of foreign 
exchange reserves, they increase governments’ monetary 
and exchange-rate autonomy. These effects tend to be 
limited and temporary in nature, but this does not mean 
that these tools should not be used: it simply means 
that they should be employed to the extent that they can 
be effective and should be fine-tuned to compensate 
for financial markets’ tendency to evade them; these 
mechanisms do, in any event, entails costs which contribute 
to the effectiveness of these regulations.18 One promising 
approach for heightening their effects and blending 
them with other regulatory instruments is to convert the 
traditional bank reserve requirements for capital inflows, 
such as those used in the past by Chile and Colombia, into 
reserve requirements for foreign-currency liabilities of the 
financial sector and of non-financial agents. This would 
be in line with other monetary and financial regulatory 
instruments that target stocks rather than flows.
In addition to these instruments, domestic financial 
regulations can also be used as countercyclical tools. 
This option, which Spain pioneered in the year 2000, 
is precisely what the Bank of International Settlements 
and eclac have been recommending for more than a 
decade now.19 The current crisis has steered the debate 
towards an active use of these types of instruments. The 
approach adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in 2010 tends to favour the use of capital 
requirements as a countercyclical tool. This tool could 
be supplemented, however, with the countercyclical 
use of loan-loss provisions (the Spanish system) or 
liquidity requirements, along with the broader range of 
policy measures discussed earlier, and especially those 
designed to cope with the procyclical effects of asset 
prices. An important point here is the need to avoid 
currency mismatches in countries’ balance sheets, since 
they generate high levels of risk for developing countries 
and are one of the main sources of the procyclical effects 
of exchange-rate fluctuations.
18  For a review of the literature on this question, see Ocampo (2008) 
and Ostry and others (2010).
19  For a review of the background and debate on this issue, see 
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2010); for a review of Spain’s experience, 
see Saurina (2009).
In addition to these two types of countercyclical 
regulations for managing capital account or domestic 
financial cycles, there are a number of others. One that was 
in great favour during the 2003-2008 boom focuses on the 
improvement of the structure of public-sector liabilities. 
Tax measures are one type of instrument that has not 
yet been used for this purpose, however. One possibility 
would be to introduce tax provisions that discourage 
the use of external credit by lowering the allowable tax 
deduction for the financial costs associated with such 
liabilities, as suggested by Stiglitz and Bhattacharya 
(2000) more than a decade ago.
The recent empirical literature on the subject is 
overwhelmingly in favour of this approach. It shows, 
in particular, that the developing economies’ lower 
level of external vulnerability was a decisive factor in 
their relatively strong performance during the recent 
global financial crisis. Different studies have linked 
this lower level of external vulnerability with different 
combinations of five interrelated factors: (i) smaller 
current account deficits; (ii) competitive exchange rates; 
(iii) ample foreign exchange reserves; (iv) low levels of 
short-term external liabilities; and (v) the regulation of 
capital flows.20 This emphasis on external vulnerability 
validates the idea that the macroeconomic predominance 
of the balance of payments is the crucial factor that must 
be addressed in developing economies.
This is the underlying source of the solid 
macroeconomic position of developing countries over 
the past decade, rather than sound fiscal positions (with 
some notable exceptions, such as India) or the expansion 
of independent central banks that adopt inflation targeting 
and flexible exchange rates as their policy framework. A 
flexible system of administered exchange rates has come 
into general practice, along with, implicitly, approaches 
to monetary and exchange-rate management that combine 
inflation targeting with targets for the level of economic 
activity and the exchange rate. This administered 
flexibility and its combination with varying mixes of 
proactive and macroprudential measures for managing 
foreign exchange reserves, including the regulation of 
capital flows, have succeeded in reducing the countries’ 
external exposure and increasing their monetary and 
exchange-rate autonomy.
Latin America’s main achievement during the 
2003-2008 boom was the reduction of its external debt 
and, in particular, the improvement of its net foreign 
exchange reserves position, as shown in figure  4, thanks 
20  See, among many others, Frankel and Saravelos (2010); Frenkel (2010); 
Llaudes, Salman and Chivakul (2010); Ostry and others (2010).
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both to debt reduction and to the build-up of reserves. 
The development of a domestic government bond market 
was an important step in this process because it helped to 
reduce the public sector’s long-standing dependence on 
external financing. The factors underlying this improvement 
were not the reduction in the region’s fiscal disequilibria 
as such, which has actually been in place for the past two 
decades (see figure 3), nor the increasing propensity to 
use countercyclical fiscal policies, which, as we have 
seen, continue to be the exception rather than the rule. 
Nor was it a slowdown in the growth rate of aggregate 
demand, which, in fact, was climbing steeply. These 
observations are corroborated by figure 5, which shows 
that there was, on average, an improvement in the current 
account, although this was due more to the upswing in the 
terms of trade than to austerity measures. In fact, when 
adjusted for the terms of trade, the figures point to a sharp 
deterioration in the current account. This indicates that 
Latin America, on average, spent the proceeds from the 
boom in commodity prices. This has actually been the 
rule, with the exception of only a handful of countries 
(Ocampo, 2009). Be this at it may, what were, overall, 
fairly well-balanced current account results, helped 
along by booming commodity prices, contributed to an 
improvement in external balance sheets which, in turn, 
gave macroeconomic policymakers greater autonomy.
FIGURE 4
Latin America: external debt as a percentage of gdp, 1998-2010
(Dollars at 2000 prices)
Source: Original estimates based on information drawn from the database maintained by the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (eclac).
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1. Patterns of specialization and  
economic growth
Economic growth is invariably accompanied by changes 
in production structures, including changes in the 
composition of gdp and employment and in international 
specialization patterns. In addition, in developing 
countries, sharp gains in productivity are invariably linked 
to shifts in labour from low- to high-productivity sectors, 
as noted in classic development theory and discussed more 
recently by Ros (2000). Most traditional studies ignore 
this link between economic growth and the production 
structure, however, portraying this structure as simply 
a by-product of growth. The essence of the structuralist 
views, including those that eclac has espoused over the 
years, is that these changes are neither mere by-products 
nor neutral in terms of their effects; quite to the contrary, 
they are the actual engine of economic growth. Seen 
from this perspective, development can be understood 
as an economy’s capacity to generate new dynamic 
production activities (Ocampo, 2005). By the same 
token, an absence of growth is linked to an interruption 
of the process of structural change. 
In industrialized countries, this process is driven 
by technological change. Since technology generation 
is highly concentrated at the world level, it creates a 
centre-periphery pattern, as explained by Prebisch. In 
developing countries, growth is driven by the capacity to 
absorb, with a certain lag, these technological changes 
and economic activities as they become technologically 
mature and are gradually transferred to the periphery, or 
by the capacity to respond to the demand for commodities 
generated by economic expansion at the centre. The 
transfer of technology and production activities is not a 
passive process: it entails an active effort to attract given 
industries and production activities that shift from the 
FIGURE 5
Latin America: Current account balance adjusted by the terms of trade, 1997-2010
(Percentages)
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Economic growth and structural change
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centre to the periphery as value chains disintegrate. These 
industries and activities are nonetheless new arrivals 
for the periphery and therefore still demand an active 
technological learning process that can also generate 
secondary innovations (Katz, 1987). If efforts to narrow 
the technological gap succeed, then these lags will be 
reduced and developing countries may even become 
secondary sources of technology.
This emphasis on changing production structures 
is not at odds with the need to achieve higher rates of 
investment. Rapidly growing economies also have high 
investment rates, but this link is much less systematic 
than the one that exists between economic growth and 
structural change (Ocampo, Rada and Taylor, 2009, chap. 
3). This is because high investment rates are actually 
more of an effect than a cause of dynamic structural 
change. This is why more attention will be devoted here 
to structural change than to investment. This does not 
mean, however, that there may not be other determinants 
of capital formation, such as, in particular, factors related 
to financing mechanisms, although they will not be 
discussed here.
There are a number of reasons why economic growth 
and changes in production structures are interrelated. 
The first explanation, which has the longest history 
in development thought, is that different branches 
of production create very different opportunities for 
generating and transmitting technical progress and, hence, 
for boosting the economy’s productivity. The classic 
defence of industrialization made the argument that 
industrial activities were the best channel for transferring 
technology and spurring other innovations. Some primary-
sector activities, such as agriculture and mining, may 
also experience steep increases in productivity, but they 
have been less effective in transmitting those increases 
to other sectors of production.
This leads us to the second explanation, which has to 
do with different sectors’ production linkages. The more 
traditional sorts of linkages, which are the type focused 
on by Hirschman (1958), are created by the demand that 
a new activity generates for others (backward linkages) 
and the opportunities that it offers for the development of 
other activities (forward linkages). The key feature to notice 
in this connection, as well as in the case of the transmission 
of technical progress, is that, in order to generate growth 
dynamics in a given nation, these effects must take place 
within a given territory and must not radiate out to the 
rest of the world, although this is exactly what tends to 
occur in an increasingly integrated world economy.
A more recently identified type of linkage has to do 
with what Hidalgo and others (2007) call the “product 
space”. In these authors’ view, the factors and inputs 
used in a given branch of production are invariably 
specific in nature: particular kinds of production plants 
or facilities, workers with certain types of skills, specific 
intermediate inputs, etc. Consequently, they cannot be 
directly shifted over to other economic activities except 
at the cost of lower levels of productivity. They can, 
however, be used or adapted for use in activities that are 
near to the “product space”. In this view, a production 
activity’s capacity to innovate and diversify will depend 
on what activities are “nearby”. Thus, depending on the 
“density” of nearby production activities (the authors use 
the simile of a forest which is more dense in some areas 
and sparser in others), they will generate very different 
opportunities for the diversification of production.
These two phenomena, which, in a broad sense, can 
be referred to as “innovation” and “complementarities”, 
are the essential components of any production-sector 
development policy. The interrelationship between the 
two is the source of most externalities and, hence of 
market failures: coordination problems and the leaks 
and diffusion of information (including technological 
information). In the first case, the key problem lies in 
the interrelationship among the investment decisions 
of different economic agents, since, in the absence of 
coordination among those agents (which the market 
does not guarantee), investments may not be made or 
may be made at suboptimal levels. In the second case, 
the “new information” may be costly for the agent 
that needs to generate or acquire it, while the benefits 
may largely be reaped by other agents. As a result, the 
investment made in acquiring that information may also 
be suboptimal.
There is plentiful evidence of a link between 
specialization patterns and growth rates. In the recent 
literature, Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) have 
made what is perhaps the most ambitious effort to 
demonstrate that the technological content or “quality” 
of countries’ exports is a fundamental determinant of 
their growth. These authors estimate that content as the 
“income level” embodied in a country’s exports (the value 
of exports, weighted by the income level of the countries 
that typically export those same products). 
Ocampo, Rada and Taylor (2009, chap. 4) engage in 
a simpler exercise in which they estimate the relationship 
between economic growth and the dominant technological 
contents of a country’s exports, using the technological 
categories proposed by Sanjaya Lall. This exercise 
indicates that countries specializing in high-technology 
exports tend to grow the fastest, followed by those 
that mainly export intermediate- and low-technology 
25
MACRoEConoMy foR dEVELoPMEnT: CoUnTERCyCLICAL PoLICIES And PRodUCTIon SECToR TRAnSfoRMATIon  •  JoSé AnTonIo oCAMPo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 1
exports, while countries whose export structures are 
based on natural resources tend to grow more slowly. 
This tendency is not as obvious during periods when 
commodity prices are high, which indicates that one of 
the reasons why, over the long term, growth based on 
high- and even low-technology industries is preferable 
is that it relies less on price spikes or windfall profits 
and thus engenders a more stable development process. 
Interestingly enough, mid-level technology exports 
(which are largely composed of standardized iron and 
steel products and chemicals, i.e., industrial commodities) 
do not afford the same advantage. 
When value chains disintegrate, the link between the 
technological content of export products and production 
activities may be broken, especially in the case of 
maquila. In these cases, and in export industries that use 
large volumes of imported inputs, the complementarities 
may also be very limited. Many export manufacturing 
activities may therefore lack the virtues that they are 
portrayed as having in the economic literature. 
Various disadvantages that are associated with a 
specialization in natural resources have been explored 
in the course of the controversy about the “natural-
resource curse”.21 Two main problems with this type of 
specialization have been identified by Agosin (2007): the 
structural effects of this pattern of specialization as such 
(i.e., production/technological effects) and macroeconomic 
vulnerability (“portfolio effects” in his terminology). To 
use the terms employed by Hidalgo and others (2007), 
the first problem may be understood as the fact that 
countries with abundant endowments of natural resources 
(including oil) are situated in sparsely populated areas 
of the product space, which limits their opportunities 
for diversifying their production activities. The second 
is that countries that specialize in natural resources are 
more prone to crises emanating from the export sector 
owing to their less diversified export structures and their 
vulnerability to sharp fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
One of the consequences of this is a strong propensity to 
use procyclical policies and vulnerability to crises that 
they generate.22 “Dutch disease” links the two problems: 
in this case, the crucial problem is that commodity price 
booms can spark exchange rate appreciations that can 
21  The paper of Sachs and Warner (1995) is the most well-known 
attempt to devise an econometrictest of the adverse growth effects of 
natural-resource-based specialization patterns. Lederman and Maloney 
(2007) offer a different interpretation according to which, above and 
beyond the economic issues addressed in the paper, they posit that this 
“curse” can also be linked to political economy factors, and particularly 
the associated rent-seeking behaviour to which it gives rise. 
22  See also Manzano and Rigobón (2007).
have lasting effects on production structures —effects 
that can turn out to be very costly when the terms of 
trade subside.23 The issues involved in exchange-rate 
management will be discussed in a later section.
There is also, however, an opposing body of literature 
that postulates that the forward and backward linkages 
of primary production activities can be used to leverage 
the diversification of production. Sweden and Finland 
boast two of the best success stories of this type of 
production-sector diversification (Blomström and Kokko, 
2007), along with Australia and New Zealand (eclac, 
2006, chap. V). There are also certain technologically 
demanding niches for commodities in terms of quality, 
processing, storage or transport, some of which also 
afford access to dynamic markets (Akyüz, 2003, chap. 1; 
eclac, 2008a, chaps. III and V).
In view of this situation, and looking beyond the 
specific issues involved in natural-resource specialization, 
the critical issue for Latin America is the low technological 
content of its production activities and its scant levels 
of research and development, not only in comparison to 
the more successful East Asian economies, but also to 
developed countries whose exports are natural-resource 
intensive. The data shown in table 2, which have been 
drawn from Cimoli and Porcile (2011) and from a broader 
eclac study (2007), corroborate these findings. 
Numerous studies have shown that one of the 
major differences between the success stories of East 
Asia and the experiences of Latin America has been 
that East Asian economies have made the transition to 
knowledge generation, whereas Latin America is still 
lagging behind in this respect (eclac, 2008a, chap. III; 
Cimoli and Porcile, 2011; and Palma, 2009 and 2011). 
Hausmann (2011) has demonstrated that the region’s 
slower long-term growth rate is correlated with a 
poorer-quality export basket and with the fact that it is, 
in general, located in less dense portions of the product 
space. In contrast, industrialized countries are, for the 
most part, situated in high-density portions of that space, 
and the rapidly growing economies of East Asia have 
been moving in that direction.
The main lesson to be drawn is that, above and 
beyond the fact that different branches of production have 
differing capacities for promoting productivity gains, the 
key to robust growth is the synchronization of export 
development, production linkages and technological 
capacity-building.
23  There are many analyses of this problem; for one of the most 
insightful, see Krugman (1987).
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TABLE 2
Specialization, the production structure and growth
 PR1 PR2 KI AI Percentage NR r&d Patents
Per capita 
gdp
Latin America 0.30 0.23 0.78 0.44 70 0.40 0.5 1.6
Natural-resource-based developed economies 0.70 0.72 0.33 1.32 59 1.89 65.4 2.3
Emerging Asian economies 0.80 0.99 0.39 2.33 30 1.21 30.5 4.8
Mature economies 0.88 0.97 0.16 1.80 24 2.43 132.6 2.0
Source: Mario Cimoli and Gabriel Porcile, “Learning, technological capabilities and structural dynamics”, in The Oxford Handbook of Latin 
American Economics, José Antonio Ocampo and Jaime Ros (eds.), New York, Oxford University Press, 2011.
Note:
Mature economies: France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States, Japan and Sweden.
Developed countries based on natural resources (NR): with 40% or more of the exports based on those resources.
PR1: Share of industrial value added accounted for by engineering industries (coefficient relative to the United States, 1982-2002).
PR2: Share of industrial value added accounted for by engineering industries (coefficient relative to the United States, 2002-2007).
Patents: Total number of patents per 1 million persons (1996-2007).
gdp pc: gdp growth per capita (1970-2008).
AI: Adaptability Index (1985-2000).
KI: Krugman Index (vs. United States)
R&D: Investment in research and development as a percentage of gdp (1996-2007).
2. Production-sector development policies in 
open economies
The relationship between production structures and 
economic growth has major economic policy implications. 
Inasmuch as development is closely linked with changes 
in production structures, an essential task of economic 
policy is ensuring that the economy has the capacity to 
bring about dynamic changes in its production patterns by 
putting into place proactive production-sector development 
policies. This concept is preferable to that of industrial 
policies because it does not necessarily assume, as 
used to be the case, that these measures are specific to 
manufacturing industries but instead recognizes that 
they can be implemented in natural-resource or service-
intensive sectors as well. One of the virtues of this 
approach is that it opens up development opportunities 
for many countries of the region that do not have the 
capacity to export high-technology products.
In open economies such as those of Latin America 
today, progress in this area is closely intertwined with 
the capacity to develop increasingly high-technology 
export structures. The domestic market should not be 
overlooked, however, because it plays a critical role in 
economic growth. For most of the countries in the region, 
regional integration should serve the same purpose as a 
larger domestic market would, but, in order for this to 
be possible, the many economic (strong susceptibility 
to the business cycle) and political obstacles that are 
hindering the implementation of such integration 
initiatives will have to be overcome. Particular attention 
also needs to be devoted to export activities’ production 
linkages, which represent what might be thought of as 
the “domestic market” generated by an export activity. 
These linkages are some of the complementarities 
created by this type of activity. It can also be argued 
that the competitiveness of a given export sector, which 
makes it less prone to relocation, lies precisely in the 
complementary production activities that supply it with 
inputs or services at the local level, especially in the 
case of non-tradable (or imperfectly tradable) goods and 
services. These complementarities are, to use the term 
employed by eclac (1990), sources of system-wide 
competitiveness.
The debate surrounding types of production-sector 
development policies has raised a number of questions 
that will be looked at only very briefly here. The first 
question is what the focus of such policies should be. 
The literature tends to advocate placing emphasis on 
innovative activities that generate externalities in a given 
economic area (see Ocampo, 2005; Rodrik, 2007a, chap. 4; 
and Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009). This approach 
underscores a factor that is of key importance, as we have 
seen, in a world where value chains are breaking down. 
In turn, the term “innovation” should not be understood 
as being restricted to technological innovation, but should 
instead be interpreted in a broader sense as referring to 
new types of activity. It thus includes not only technology 
(new production processes and new products), but also 
marketing and markets (for example, new ways of 
marketing products and the conquest of new markets), 
new ways of structuring a company or an industry, and 
the development of new sources of raw materials. This 
is an approach that I have advocated in an earlier paper 
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(Ocampo, 2005), but it is also the one used by Australia 
and New Zealand in their innovation policies (eclac, 
2006, chap. V). The generation of externalities (which 
may be technological, commercial or both) is crucial, 
since their presence implies that the benefits of innovation 
will not be appropriated exclusively by the innovating 
firm but can instead be replicated.24 
In the long run, the chief objective of any production-
sector development policy is, in any event, to build 
technological capabilities. This raises a second series 
of questions. Some of them refer to the coexistence of 
high- and low-productivity sectors and ways of promoting 
the diffusion of technology. Others have to do with the 
relationship between building production capacities and 
the accumulation of technological capabilities. Acquiring 
new production capacities inevitably involves learning 
how to use a given technology, but the acquisition of 
technological capabilities is a more active process 
encompassing everything from adapting technologies, 
introducing small innovations or modifying a product 
design to developing the capacity to generate new 
technologies and new products.
In the early stages of development and, in some 
industries, even today, technological learning is a by-
product of the development of new production sectors. 
In this case, technology plays an important, but passive, 
role. Accordingly, the policy focus should be on promoting 
the sector, rather than on explicit technological strategies. 
This was, to some extent, done during the stage of State-
led industrialization. During that stage, technological 
development was a by-product, rather than the objective, 
of technological policy as such, which was absent from 
Latin America, apart from a few notable exceptions 
(including agriculture). The substitution of that strategy 
by trade liberalization certainly created incentives for 
the adoption of the best available technology so that 
producers could compete and obliged them to streamline 
their production processes. This strategy placed more 
emphasis on importing technology than on adapting 
and developing it, however. In some cases, this even 
led to the dismantlement of technological centres and 
institutions that had been developed in the past. Thus, 
in terms of their effectiveness in inducing economic 
growth, these processes proved to be less satisfactory 
in Latin America than the preceding strategy.
It is therefore of crucial importance to determine 
when or in what sectors the focus should be production 
24  When a country or region comes to be recognized as a reliable 
supplier of a given product, this generates marketing channels that 
benefit other producers.
activities as such or the development of an innovation 
system. There is no single “right” answer to this question. 
In some cases, local technological innovation is essential 
for competitiveness. This occurs in high-technology 
sectors in the region (Brazil’s aeronautics industry, for 
example), but it may also be the case in natural-resource-
intensive sectors (e.g., the role of national research 
institutes in the development of agroindustrial complexes 
of Argentina and Brazil). In any event, the adaptation 
and creation of knowledge are always “infant industries” 
and should therefore be given preferential treatment in 
any production-sector development policy.
When production-sector development policies are 
being actively implemented, it may not be clear which 
“innovative activity” should be promoted, and the idea 
of fostering innovation may, as a result, be identified 
with the promotion of a given sector’s development. In 
this type of situation, saying that all selective strategies 
are misguided because they entail “picking winners” 
is to ignore the intrinsic characteristics of production-
sector development policies. The first point that is being 
overlooked is that a learning process is involved in 
determining what should be promoted and, even more 
importantly, how to go about doing so. Many things 
have to be learned along the way, and mistakes will be 
made. Seen from this angle, the types of choices to be 
made are not very different from those that any private 
firm makes when it decides to expand into new product 
lines and has to make a strategic gamble based on the 
capacities that the firm has built up over time. Firms in 
this position are liable to make mistakes, too. The second 
point is that policies of this type are designed to create 
conditions that will lead to the initiative’s success, so that 
rather than “picking winners”, they are actually aimed 
at “creating winners”. Yet another consideration is the 
fact that, in line with one of the basic conclusions of 
modern international trade theory, when scale economies 
(including learning processes) are present, comparative 
advantages are, in large measure, created.
Regardless of whether a technological or sectoral 
approach is being taken, incentives may be either horizontal 
or selective. There are some crucial horizontal components 
that should be a part of any production-sector development 
policy, such as measures for fostering innovation and the 
diffusion of technology, improving long-term financing 
mechanisms, and supporting micro-, small and medium-
sized enterprises. Compelling arguments can be made, 
however, for selective strategies, since opportunities 
for innovation do not arise across the entire range of 
the production structure. What is more, advocates of 
the general preference for horizontal schemes overlook 
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the fact that, when such schemes rely on scarce fiscal 
resources, it becomes necessary to specify where those 
resources should be used, and this necessarily entails 
selectivity of some sort. No matter what policy tools are 
used, these kinds of choices should be made within the 
framework of a production-sector development strategy. 
And in the interests of transparency, it is better for these 
choices to be explicit rather than implicit.
A third group of questions concerns public-
private partnerships, which are an inherent part of any 
production-sector development policy. Such partnerships 
are necessary because of the information problems 
facing the various agents involved: better information 
on production processes and markets on the part of the 
business community, and better information about the 
economy as a whole and the progress of international 
negotiations and, most importantly, the capacity to 
coordinate different agents on the part of the State. It is 
important, however, to ensure that the incentives provided 
by the State actually serve a collective purpose rather than 
simply being converted into rents. The crucial issue is 
how to go about developing a close partnership that will 
ensure policy relevance while avoiding policy capture 
by the private agents involved. There are many different 
solutions for this problem, as is illustrated by the range of 
experiences in this field that can be identified the world 
over (eclac, 2008a, chap. VI; Devlin and Moguillansky, 
2010). The interaction between the public and private 
sectors should, like production-sector development 
policy, be viewed as a mutual learning process. 
The last type of question has to do with the timing 
of incentives. The fact that mistakes may be made 
implies, first of all, that the system must include clear-cut 
mechanisms for detecting errors and correcting them. The 
quid pro quo for any incentive should be a performance 
requirement, or a “reciprocal control mechanism,” to use 
Amsden’s (2001) terminology. In addition, incentives, 
by their very nature, should last only for as long as they 
continue to meet certain basic requirements: that they be 
necessary in order for innovation to take place and for it 
to be diffused to other agents. Because of information 
failures, however, it may not be feasible to set strict 
time frames at the outset of a process about which full 
information is not available. In fact, setting definite time 
frames may undermine the incentives’ effectiveness, and 
they may end up being wasted (which may increase the 
probability of creating “losers” instead of “winners” or 
may make it necessary to extend an incentive whose 
initial cut-off date had been described as firm, at the 
expense of government credibility). Again, what is 
needed is a way of designing a process that allows the 
agents involved to see when it is going off track so that 
they can correct it and to determine when the innovation 
has become consolidated.
This means that governments need to invest in the 
development of the institutions responsible for policy 
implementation. If anything can be said with certainty 
in this respect, it is that the destruction of institutions 
during the market-reform period was widespread in Latin 
America. Fortunately, some institutions survived and 
have adapted to the changed circumstances and, more 
recently, a new wave of institutional reconstruction has 
begun. The most outstanding example of this is Brazil’s 
recent production-sector development strategy.
3. interaction between the macroeconomy 
and production-sector development and the 
crucial role of the exchange rate
A simple way of visualizing the link between the 
production-sector development and macroeconomic 
conditions is by looking at the double relationship 
that exists between economic growth and productivity 
gains, as shown in figure 6 (see Ocampo, 2005). The 
function of technical progress, TT, is determined by 
structural conditions. The direction of causality in this 
case runs from the growth of production to increases 
in productivity: the expansion of the production sector 
boosts productivity by spurring investment (better 
technology embedded in production equipment), learning 
processes and the reallocation of labour from low- to 
high-productivity sectors.
A state of macroeconomic equilibrium, GG, indicates 
either that aggregate demand is in equilibrium or, if there 
is an external gap, that the balance of payments is. The 
relationship is positive in both cases, with the direction 
of causality being from productivity gains to growth, 
but it runs through different channels in each case. If 
it is demand that is in equilibrium, then increases in 
productivity will boost investment and labour income 
(and consumption) and will improve the external balance. 
In the second case, productivity gains will drive up 
exports or reduce imports and, either way, will narrow 
the external gap.
Equilibrium is reached at point A. If macroeconomic 
conditions improve, then GG shifts to the right and results 
in a new equilibrium point (B) at which there is both 
more growth and faster gains in productivity. This effect 
can operate through an expansionary macroeconomic 
policy that is sustainable because it induces higher 
investment and does not generate inflationary barriers 
or untenable balance-of-payments disequilibria. A 
29
MACRoEConoMy foR dEVELoPMEnT: CoUnTERCyCLICAL PoLICIES And PRodUCTIon SECToR TRAnSfoRMATIon  •  JoSé AnTonIo oCAMPo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 1
successful production-sector development policy will 
shift the TT function upward, as it leads both to more 
economic growth and higher productivity (point C in 
figure 6).
As pointed out by Ocampo (2005) and Ocampo, 
Rada and Taylor (2009), this implies that the relationship 
between increases in productivity and in growth runs 
in two directions, rather than, as in the traditional view, 
it simply being one in which productivity is the cause 
and economic growth is the effect.25 More specifically, 
a poor growth performance tends to undercut the rate 
of productivity growth. There can be various reasons 
for this, including a balance-of-payments crisis or a 
destructive restructuring process in the production 
sector. Declines in productivity will operate through 
the pathways mentioned earlier: lower investment, less 
learning and a perverse reallocation of labour to informal 
sectors. A strong macroeconomic performance will have 
the opposite effect.
Although this conceptual scheme can be used to 
analyse many different types of problems, here we will 
focus on the real exchange rate, which is perhaps the most 
critical macroeconomic variable in open economies. It 
also establishes a fundamental connection between the 
25  The fundamental problem has to do with the assumption of full 
employment of resources used in traditional growth models, in which 
the direction of causality runs only from productivity to growth.
analysis of growth and the analysis of countercyclical 
policies presented earlier.
The exchange rate has a number of complex 
features. One is that, because it is a macroeconomic 
variable, it cannot generate the selective incentives that 
a trade regime can, and it can therefore serve only as a 
partial, but not complete, substitute for a production-
sector development policy. Another is that it is, at one 
and the same time, both the price of a set of financial 
assets and one of the determinants of the relative price 
of internationally traded goods and services.
This latter feature gives rise to a number of 
well-known complex effects. For example, one of the 
main ideas underlying the concept of an “anti-export 
bias” was that protection led to an overvaluation of 
the exchange rate, which undermined the incentive to 
export. In orthodox theory, the expectation was therefore 
that any reduction in protection would trigger a real 
devaluation that would spur the development of the 
export sector. However, the experiences of the countries 
of the Southern Cone in the 1970s have shown us that, 
if the move to open up the current account is coupled 
with an expansion of capital inflows because the capital 
account has been opened up at the same time, not only 
does the expected real devaluation not occur, but it may 
have the exact opposite effect: a real appreciation. This 
blocks the pathway through which liberalization would 
correct the “anti-export bias” and can even give rise to 
FIGURE 6
relationship between gdp and productivity growth
Source: The author.
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a paradoxical situation in which economic growth is 
driven by domestic demand rather than by exports. This 
has often occurred in Latin America (see, among many 
others, Vos and others, 2006, chap. 3).
The empirical evidence shows that the real 
exchange rate is one of the determinants of economic 
growth. According to Rodrik’s estimates (2007b) for 
developing countries in the period from 1950 to 2004, a 
10% undervaluation of the exchange rate was associated 
with 0.27% in additional growth per year. One of the 
explanations that he offers has to do with the externalities 
generated by producers of tradables and indicates that 
an undervaluation of the exchange rate functions as a 
partial substitute for a production-sector development 
policy. Hausmann, Pritchet and Rodrik (2005) show 
that one of the factors behind an acceleration in growth 
rates in developing countries is a competitive exchange 
rate. This evidence is also in line with the findings of 
Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and the results 
of Frenkel’s and Rapetti’s review of the literature (2010), 
which indicate that higher growth rates are associated 
with improved current account balances.
Frenkel and Taylor (2007) call this effect of the real 
exchange rate on growth the “development effect” and 
draw a distinction between this and other effects of this 
variable, such as its short-run macroeconomic effect, 
which, as we have seen, is ambiguous, and its impact 
on employment. The development effect is linked, first 
of all, with the externalities generated by the dynamic 
development of tradables, which include the repercussions 
that this has on the diversification of the export structure. 
Second, it is associated with the fact that economies 
with a robust current account are less sensitive to sharp 
turnarounds in the capital account, which, as we have 
seen, has been one of the most important lessons learned 
from recent crises. One way of understanding these 
effects is to see that a stable, competitive exchange rate 
shifts TT upward (see figure 6) (i.e., serves as a partial 
substitute for a production-sector development policy) 
and shifts GG to the right (i.e., moves the macroeconomy 
towards a balanced position).
Apart from these development effects, the exchange 
rate has, as noted by Frenkel and Taylor (2007), additional 
implications for employment that have to do with its 
effect on labour-output elasticity. A real revaluation 
tends to reduce this elasticity in two different ways: 
first, it lowers the price of production equipment in 
economies that import a large share of their machinery 
and equipment, which leads to a substitution of capital 
for labour; second, it tends to bias the selection of inputs 
in production processes towards imported inputs, which 
weakens domestic production linkages.
Instability in the real exchange rate also heightens 
risk and thereby depresses investment in the production 
of tradable goods and services that can be exported or 
used as import substitutes. This problem is compounded 
by the greater vulnerability to international price shocks 
displayed by countries that are dependent on commodity 
exports. And, in point of fact, the greater volatility of the 
real exchange rate in the countries of South America, as 
illustrated in figure 7, is associated with this subregion’s 
greater reliance on such products.
This underscores the fact that the macroeconomic 
challenges are especially formidable in economies where 
a considerable portion of the export base is composed 
of natural-resource-based goods. In order to deal with 
this situation, mechanisms need to be developed that 
can soften the macroeconomic impacts of fluctuations 
in the prices of these types of goods. This brings us back 
to the importance of the role of stabilization funds in 
these economies.
It should be remembered, however, that even in 
economies in which natural-resource-based products 
make up a large share of exports, the real exchange 
rate is not determined solely by export prices. Figure 
7 shows, for example, that Peru has been much more 
successful in avoiding exchange-rate volatility than other 
South American countries, thanks to its central bank’s 
active intervention in foreign-exchange markets. The 
other side of the coin is that the introduction of more 
flexible exchange rates heightens the volatility of the 
real exchange rate, especially in economies dependent 
upon natural-resource-based exports. This points in the 
direction of the use of managed flexible exchange rates 
as part of the broader countercyclical policies that have 
been examined in earlier sections of this lecture. 
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The argument made here is that a sound macroeconomic 
policy for development combines well-designed 
countercyclical policies with a proactive strategy for the 
diversification of the production structure. Countercyclical 
fiscal policies should be used to meet the challenges posed 
by the sharp swings in external financing cycles faced 
by developing countries, as well as steep fluctuations 
in commodity prices. However, while countercyclical 
fiscal policy is an extremely important tool, it needs to 
be paired with an equally countercyclical monetary and 
exchange-rate policy. The core objective of this latter 
policy should be to ease the pressure for procyclical 
monetary and exchange policies that is generated 
by external financing cycles in countries with open 
capital accounts. In the light of the experiences of the 
last decade, it would seem that this can be achieved 
by using intermediate exchange-rate regimes in which 
an active management of foreign exchange reserves is 
employed as a stabilization mechanism, in conjunction 
with macroprudential policies, which include capital-
account regulations.
The need for a production-sector development 
strategy stems from the close relationship that exists 
between economic growth and the diversification of 
production structures. The central policy objective is 
to promote innovative production activities that will 
generate strong production linkages and, through 
them, system-wide competitiveness. The concept of 
“innovation” should be understood in the broad sense 
of the term, i.e., not as being confined to technological 
innovation, but as encompassing the creation of new 
production activities, new marketing methods, the 
FIGURE 7
Coefficient of variation in the real exchange rate, 1990-2010 and 2004-2010
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conquest of new markets and new ways of organizing 
a company or an industry. The critical test, however, 
is the extent to which it helps an economy build up 
technological capabilities. The challenge is particularly 
formidable in economies that, like most of those of Latin 
America, have static, natural-resource-based comparative 
advantages. The exploitation of those advantages 
should not, however, be a barrier to the diversification 
of the production structure, and steps should be taken 
to ensure that increasingly sophisticated technologies 
are incorporated into the countries’ natural-resource-
based production activities. Wise management of the 
exchange rate throughout the business cycle is essential 
if this is to be accomplished.
Countercyclical policy and the diversification of 
production are crucial elements in the contributions to 
economic thought made by eclac and, in particular, 
Raúl Prebisch, in whose honour this lecture series 
was created. And they, in turn, are based on two other 
fundamental concepts: the key importance of managing 
the external vulnerabilities of economies whose 
macroeconomic dynamics are subject to “balance-of-
payments predominance”, and the close relationship 
that exists between economic growth and changing 
production patterns. These two pivotal ideas are as 
valid today as they were in the past and demonstrate 
the cogency of the concepts that eclac has espoused 
throughout its history. 
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